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Public  choice  in agriculture is an emerging field in agricultural 
economic  research.  The  paper's  focus  is on the determinants  of the U.S. 
wheat producer  support price.  The  econometric  time-series analysis 
suggests  that this price is largely determined by  the previous price,  the 
expected U.S.  share in world exports,  and expected program costs. 
Presidential elections also  influence U.S.  wheat price policies.  All 
other things being equal,  the  support price tends  to be  lower  in election 
years  than in other years.  This  suggests  that small  interest groups' 
relative political economic  power  may  be  smaller in election years if they 
do  not  succeed in positioning themselves  on  the political economic market 
such that they contain the potentially decisive voter. Determinants  of the U.S.  Wheat  Producer  Support  Price: 
A Time  Series Analysis 
Harald von Witzke,  St.  Paul,  MN* 
1.  Introduction 
Throughout  the world,  agriculture is subject to more  or less  intense 
government  intervention.  There  is a  characteristic pattern of government 
involvement  in the  course of economic  development.  In less developed 
countries,  where  agriculture represents  the majority or at least a  large 
fraction of the population,  agriculture is often heavily taxed.  In 
developed countries,  such as  the United States,  agriculture is only a 
small  sector of the  economy but tends  to be  subsidized  (e.g.  Peterson, 
1979;  Bale  and Lutz,  1982). 
Typically,  government market  intervention is characterized by various 
adverse allocative and distributive effects.  Not  surprisingly,  U.S. 
agricultural and trade policy has  drawn much  criticism over the years 
(e.g.  Cochrane,  1985).  Although  a  number  of proposals  for  a  more  or less 
drastic policy reform have been put forward  (e.g.  Rausser  and Foster, 
1986;  Ruttan,  1986;  Runge  and Halbach,  1987),  the  more  than 50  year old 
U.S.  price  and  income  policy is still being continued in principle.  Of 
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University and  the World  Bank. course,  there have been quite  remarkable policy changes  such as  the 
introduction of deficiency payments  or measures  of domestic  supply 
management.  However,  the principle of U.S.  agricultural policy,  namely  to 
provide  income  support  to  farmers  via a  government  regulated minimum  price 
has  remained  the  same.  While  the  system of government  intervention in 
grains has  fluctuated only gradually over  time,  the  level of real producer 
price  support has  changed quite  remarkably since  the early 60's  (figure 1). 
Applications  of public choice  theory to  the  analysis of agricultural 
policy formation have  led to valuable general  insights  into  the 
determinants  of agricultural policy decision making  in various parts of 
the world  (e.g.  Bates,  1981;  Anderson  and Hayami,  1986;  Olson,  1986; 
Hayami,  1988).1  However,  knowledge  of the  determinants  of U.S. 
agricultural policy decisions  is still limited  (Schuh,  1981;  Spitze, 
1986). 
Agriculture  in the United States has  become  increasingly open and 
operates  in an  increasingly international economic  environment.  The  core 
of public choice  theory,  however,  is still largely domestic  in character. 
"International aspects  are rarely dealt with in public choice  as  evidenced 
by their complete neglect in surveys  and  textbooks.  On  the  other hand 
there is a  'demand'  for  a  public choice analysis  in this  area by 
international trade theorists ......  "  (Frey,  1984). 
Analyses  of the  determinants  of U.S.  agricultural policies have 
followed  several lines of research.  First,  there are  studies that 
incorporate  endogenous  government behavior  into traditional market models 
(e.g.  Dixit and Martin,  1986).  Typically,  the public  choice part of these 
models  is heuristic  in character and  focuses  on domestic policy 
determinants.  Second,  there are  formal  models  that are  in the  main  stream 
2 of public choice literature.  The  main  focus  of this  type  of analysis  is 
on domestic  aspects  of policy formation.  The  empirical results  tend to 
support  the  central hypotheses  of public choice  theory for u.s. 
agricultural policy  (Gardner,  1987).  Third,  there are  studies that 
explain international  trade  on selected markets  with endogenous 
government  decisions  in major  trading countries  including  the United 
States  (e.g.  Abbott,  1979;  Sarris  and Freebairn,  1983).  Although  these 
studies explicitly capture  important  international aspects  of national 
agricultural policy formation,  the results are naturally too  general  to 
yield more  specific  and detailed insights  into  the  determinants  of U.S. 
agricultural price policy decisions.2 
Here  we  will develop  a  formal  model  that specifically focuses  on U.S. 
wheat policy decisions.  It will be based on public choice  theory and will 
incorporate  some  international aspects  of endogenous  national policy 
decisions.  The  model  is of the  reduced  form  type  and  aims  at explaining 
U.S.  producer price support for wheat  over  time.  It represents  a  supply-
side  approach  to agricultural policy modeling  in the  tradition of Stigler 
(1970),  Posner  (1974),  and  Pe1tzman  (1976)  in that it is based on  the 
political economic  calculus of the regulator,  i.e.  the agricultural policy 
decision maker  as  the  supplier of a  minimum  producer price.3  Following, 
we  will first develop  the  conceptual  framework  and  then test the model 
empirically.  The  study concludes with  some  implications  for  international 
interactions of endogenous  national agricultural policy decisions  in the 
context of the present round of multilateral trade negotiations  in the 
General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT). 
3 2.  Conceptual  Framework 
Hayami  (1987)  describes  the central elements  of political economic 
markets  in agriculture,  based on classical public choice  theoretical 
analyses  such  as  those by  Buchanan  and Tullock,  (1962),  Downs  (1957), 
Olson  (1965)  and Stigler  (1970).  According  to  this  framework,  an 
equilibrium on any  given political economic  market prevails when  the 
policymaker's marginal political economic  costs  (loss of political support 
or votes)  equal  the marginal benefits  (gain in political support or votes) 
resulting from  a  change  in a  government  regulated price.  Our  theoretical 
considerations  follow  this  framework  (see also Riethmuller  and Roe,  1986). 
One  central element of U.S.  wheat policies  in the last few  decades 
has  been  the  loan rate which provides  a  price floor  to producers.  In the 
early 60's producer prices were  'decoupled'  from  the  loan rate.  Beginning 
in 1963/64  the  loan rate was  supplemented by direct payments.  In 1974/75 
a  target price was  introduced where  the  difference between target price, 
and  loan rate or market price is a  deficiency payment. 
Other measures  of market  intervention have been employed  as well  such 
as  'payment  in kind'  subsidies  or acreage  reduction programs.4  Although 
it may  be  desirable  to  incorporate  some  of these  instruments  into an 
analysis of U.S.  wheat price policy decisions we  have  elected to  focus 
only on  the  level of producer price support.5 
For  the purpose of this  study,  it should be  emphasized that the 
producer price during  the period analyzed here has  been  'decoupled'  from 
consumer price.  That  is,  non-agricultural households  are not directly 
affected by producer price support  in the  form  of a  target price. 
However,  they are affected indirectly as price support results  in 
budgetary expenditures.  Consider  the  following strictly concave  criterion 
4 function  (W)  that a  single agricultural policymaker maximizes  in every 
period t,  by setting a  producer price. 
(1)  W t 
s.t. 
(2)  Yt 
(3)  Bt 
where 
Y  producer  income 
B  budgetary expenditures  caused by producer price support 
P  producer price 
t  time  index 
In eq.  (1),  income  of producers  can be  interpreted as  a  determinant 
of the  decision makers'  political support  from  this group.  Budgetary 
expenditures  (revenues)  caused by  a  government  regulated price represent 
the  loss  (gain)  of political support  from  the rest of the electorate.  If 
the  producer price  (the target price)  were  equal  to  the  consumer price it 
would be necessary to  add  Pt  as  an  argument  to eq.  (1).  In this case, 
the welfare of non-agricultural households  would be  directly affected by 
the  supported producer price. 
Maximizing eq.(l)  subject to  the constraints  in eqs.  (2)  and  (3) 
yields  the  optimum condition for  the  government  controlled price in eq. 
(4).  Its political economic  interpretation is obvious.  The  agricultural 
policy decision maker  sets  the price  such  that marginal political benefit 
equals  the marginal cost. 
5 where 
oWt/oYt  >  0, 
oYt/oPt  >  0, 
oWt/oBt  <  0, 
oBt/oPt  >  0. 
As  the criterion function is assumed  to be strictly concave,  there  is 
a  solution to  this problem for  Pt.  The  structural parameters,  however, 
cannot be  identified unless  the  parameters  of the  criterion function and 
the constraints are known.  Denote  the  optimal price in period  t  by  Pt , 
and let the  solution to  this problem 
be: 6 
(5)  Pt  =  Qo  +  Q2Yt  +  Q3Bt 
Usually po1icymakers  are not perfectly free  to adjust a  regulated 
price over  time  as  there  are various  contractual policy constraints.  The 
time  cost of decision making  tend to  increase with  increasing extent of 
price adjustments.  Major  price adjustments  may  even require special 
legislation.  Moreover,  po1icymakers  may  be  constrained by bills that 
cover several periods  and may  restrict policy adjustments.  U.S.  farm 
bills represent examples  of these  types  of constraints as  farm bills 
contain at least some  guidelines for  annual  price adjustments. 
A  common  way  to  account  for  such constraints is the Ner10vian partial 
adjustment  approach  (Ner10ve,  1958).  In our case it implies  that the 
actual difference of the  producer price between  two  periods  is  a  constant 
fraction of the difference between  the optimal price and  the past price. 
(6)  Pt  - Pt -1  o  <  c  <  1 
6 In eq.  (6),  Ut  represents  an error term that is assumed  to be  normally 
and  independently distributed.  Combining eqs.(5)  and  (6)  yields: 
(7)  Pt  =  ~o +  ~lPt-l +  ~2Yt +  ~3Bt +  Ut 
where 
~o =  CQo'  ~l =  l-c,  ~2 =  CQ2,  and  ~3 =  CQ3 
As  mentioned earlier,  this analysis  attempts  to  capture national as 
well  as  some  international aspects  of policy formation.  The  right-hand 
side of eq.  (7)  contains variables which,  at first glance,  may  be 
perceived as  domestic  in nature.  However,  the wheat  sector has been very 
export oriented during  the  time  period analyzed here.  Generally,  exports 
and  incomes  are closly related on  such markets.  Exports  in turn are 
influenced not only by  domestic variables but also by  such variables  as 
world market prices or exchange  rates.  Similarly,  budgetary expenditures 
caused by deficiency payments  are also  influenced by  the world market 
price.  A relatively high  (low)  world market price of wheat  (if it 
exceeds  the  loan rate)  reduces  (increases)  the  deficiency payment per 
bushel of wheat produced and  thus  the budgetary expenditures  caused by  the 
supported wheat producer price. 
The  model  developed here  focuses  on  the  level of the  domestic  producer 
support price.  An  alternative and more  common  approach would be  to use 
the  domestic price relative to  the world market price  (e.g.  nominal  rate 
of protection)  as  an endogenous variable.  On  the  one  hand,  this would 
make  international aspects  of domestic policy formation more  explicit.  On 
the  other hand,  it would,  however,  complicate  the  empirical analysis  and 
would  render its interpretation more  difficult.  The  central problem  in 
this  regard is that  a  variable  such  as  the nominal  rate of protection 
changes  not only as  a  consequence  of  a  change  in the level of the 
7 government  supported price but also with changes  in the world market price 
or  the  exchange  rate.  For  instance,  even if the  domestic  price  remains 
unchanged  the nominal  rate of protection would  change  when  the world 
market price changes.  National policies are  pursued mainly for  domestic 
reasons  but they are  influenced by various  international variables.  In 
our  example,  the  endogenous variable would  change  although  the  domestic 
producer  support price did not.  Consequently,  one  would have  to  account 
for  this  change by  a  suitable right hand side variable.  This  in turn 
would complicate  the  empirical analysis  and may  result in multi-
collinearities as both agricultural  incomes  and budgetary expenditures may 
be  affected by world price changes.  Therefore,  we  have  elected to base 
the analysis  on  the  level of the  domestic  producer price support. 
Olson's  (1965)  analysis  of the relative political power  of interest 
groups  on political economic  markets has  stimulated a  large number  of 
studies,  suggesting that relatively small  interest groups,  such as 
agricultural commodity  groups  in developed countries,  tend to be  more 
successful at least until  some  threshold is reached  (e.g.  Becker,  1983; 
Anderson and Hayami,  1986;  Gardner,  1987;  Hayami,  1987).  While  there  is 
plenty of evidence  supporting this view,  the  change  in interest groups' 
success  over  the election cycle has  not  received much  attention.  It may 
immediately appear  to be  counterintuitive that small  interest groups  have 
a  relatively more  powerful political economic bargaining position in 
election than in non-election years  as  only  a  relatively small  number  of 
votes  may  be  gained by allocating political favors  to  such  groups.  In 
fact,  policymakers  may  be better off concentrating their efforts on 
relatively large groups  where  more  votes  can be potentially gained  (e.g. 
Downs,  1957;  Breton,  1974). 
8 However,  if a  small  interest group  succeeds  in positioning itself such 
that it contains  the median  (or  the  decisive)  voter,  small  interest groups 
may  well be  even more  successful  in extracting rents  in election years 
than in non-election years.  As  Frey  (1984)  has  noted,  public choice 
models  that are based on  the  policymakers'  maximization of political 
support or votes  may,  in fact,  be misspecified if they neglect election 
cycles," ... because between elections  a  democratically chosen government 
may  well yield to  the pressures  of the  organized groups,  in particular 
because it needs  their support  to carry out its economic policies 
successfully,  and also because it is interested in their financial  support 
in view of future  elections." 
If the  above  considerations  are correct,  then  the  question of the 
changing relative political power  of smaller interest groups,  such as 
agricultural producer groups,  represents,  in fact,  an empirical problem. 
In many  cases  one  would expect  the relative political economic  power  of 
small  interest groups  to be  lower  in election years.  The  government  may 
still enjoy the  support of these  groups  as  they have  learned from past 
experience  that they will be  compensated by more  political favors  in non-
election years.  Only if an interest group  consistently succeeds  in 
positioning itself on  the political economic  market  such that it contains 
the median  (or  the  decisive)  voter will it consistently extract relatively 
more political economic  rents  in election years  than in non-election 
years.  Some  interest groups  may  succeed in being decisive  in some 
elections  and may  fail to  do  so  in others.  In this case  an empirical 
analysis would be very difficult unless  one  is able  to  find an 
explanation for  this  phenomenon. 
9 The  above  considerations of the  changing relative political power  of 
small  interest groups  do  not contradict one  of Olson's basic hypotheses, 
namely  that such groups  tend to be  relatively more  successful  on political 
economic markets.  Our  considerations  imply,  however,  that  the  success  of 
interest groups  may  change  systematically over  the  election cycle.  In the 
following  empirical analysis  we  will test whether  this is the  case with 
regard to U.S.  wheat producers. 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
3.1  The  Empirical  Model 
In eq.  (7),  the producer price for  t  is determined by  the agricultural 
policymaker at some  prior time.  Let  this be at t-l.  At  this  time  the 
policymakers  know  neither Yt  nor  Bt .  Hence,  Yt  and  Bt  have  to be 
substituted by their respective expected values  Bt*  and Yt*.  Economic 
theory suggests  that economic  agents  form  expectations based on  the 
available  information at the  time  of the  decision which  is  commonly 
denoted as: 
(8)  Yt*  E  (Yt  It-I) 
(9)  Bt*  E  (Bt  It-I) 
Moreover, 
(10)  Yt  Y *  t  + Vt 
(11)  Bt  Bt* +  Wt 
Substituting eqs.  (10)  and  (11)  into eq.  (7)  and  including E yields: 
We  are now  in a  position to  discuss  the  expected signs of the 
parameters.  According  to  the  theoretical analysis  the  sign of fio  is not 
determined a  priori.  In developed countries where  agriculture  tends  to be 
10 subsidized,  such as  in the United States,  one  would expect  the  signs  of 
both P2  and  P3  to be negative.  That  is,  a  relatively low  (high)  expected 
agricultural  income  or relatively low  (high)  expected budgetary 
expenditures  lead to  a  relatively high  (low)  producer  support price.  As 
o  <  c  <  I,  PI  can be  expected to be positive.  A presidential election 
year will be  accounted for by  a  dummy  variable  (E).  It is 1  in an 
election year  and  0  in all other years.  Hence,  if the relative political 
power  (i.e.  the  producer  support price)  of wheat producers  is 
systematically lower  (higher)  in election than in non-election years,  the 
sign of the  dummy  variable will be  negative  (positive). 
The  nature of the error term in eq.  (12)  deserves  some  further 
discussion.  As  Nelson  (1975)  has  noted,  the error term  typically results 
in some  complications when  exogenous variables have  to be  substituted by 
their anticipations.  A closer look at Et reveals  that this is  the  case 
here.  As  Et - Ut  - P2Vt  - P3Wt,  the use  of OLS  would yield inconsistent 
estimates.  In essence,  this  problem requires  suitable  instrument 
variables  for  the anticipations  (e.g.  Wallis,  1980;  McCallum,  1969). 
The  empirical  analysis  is over  the  time  period 1963/64  to  1983/84. 
The  data used are  from  USDA  publications.  All monetary variables have 
been deflated by  the  CPl.  Detailed information  on the specific  income 
situation of U.S.  wheat  farmers  is not available.  As  policymakers  do  not 
have  such  information either,  a  proxy can be  used without  a  major risk of 
biased estimates.  A number  of different proxies  for Y could be used  in 
principle such  as  overall  farm  income  or  farm  income  in major wheat 
producing states.  We  have  elected to use  the U.S.  share  in world wheat 
exports  for  the  following  reasons.  The  U.S.  wheat  sector has  been very 
export oriented during  the  time  period analyzed here.  The  U.S.  share  in 
11 world exports  is commonly  perceived as  a  good  indicator of the  income 
situation of wheat  farmers.  It also makes  the  international aspects  of 
wheat  farming more  explicit. 
3.2  Empirical Results 
The  instruments  for  the anticipations Yt*  and Bt* were  estimated via 
autoregressions.  A one-period lag was  chosen for  each  time  series based 
on  the  significance of the coefficients.  The  results are  summarized in 
the appendix. 
The  empirical test of eq.  (12)  in which  Et  was  alternatively used to 
account  for presidential election years  gave  the  following results:8 
(13)  Pt  =  4.207  +  .6362Pt _l  - *  .0808Yt  - .6049Bt * 
(2.90)  (5.21)  (-2.73)  (-2.59) 
R:2  .853 
p  -.291  ( -1. 16) 
(14)  Pt  5.376  +  .5798Pt _l  *  *  .2755Et  - .1028Yt  -.8542Bt  -
(5.449)  (6.798)  (-5.15)  (-5.25)  (-3.25) 
R2  .891 
p  -.728  (-4.40) 
Based on  the results of the  regression analyses,  the central 
hypotheses  developed  in this paper cannot be  rejected.  The  coefficients 
*  *  for  Yt  and Bt  have  the  expected negative signs  and  are highly 
significant in both eq.  (13)  and eq.  (14).  This  is,  a  relatively low 
(high)  expected share  in world wheat  exports  (proxy for wheat producer 
income)  or relatively low  (high)  budgetary expenditures result in a 
comparatively high  (low)  wheat producer  support price,  ceteris  paribus. 
These  results are  similar to  those  obtained in time  series analyses  of 
the  determinants  of agricultural price support  in other developed 
countries  such  as  Japan or  the  European  Community  (e.g.  Riethrnuller  and 
12 Roe,  1986;  von Witzke,  1986),  suggesting that in developed countries 
fluctuations  in agricultural price support over  time  are predominantly 
driven by producer  incomes  and budgetary expenditures  caused by price 
support. 
Overall,  the results of eq.  (14),  which also contains  Et ,  are 
statistically somewhat  stronger  than those  of eq.  (13).  The  sign of Et  is 
negative  and highly significant.  All other  things being equal,  producer 
price support  in wheat  is about  27  cents per bushel  lower  in presidential 
election years  than in other years.  This  suggests  that,  during  the period 
analysed here,  U.S.  wheat producers have  not been able  to position 
themselves  on  the political economic  market  such that they contain the 
median or the decisive voter. 
As  mentioned above,  not much  is known  about  the relative political 
economic  success  of interest groups  over  the election cycle.  Hence,  this 
study's empirical  findings  in this regard can not be  generalized.  It may 
turn out that the pattern found  in this  study is typical of many 
relatively small pressure  groups  in democracies,  but it is as well 
possible that the  fluctuation of small  interest groups'  relative success 
over  the election cycle  depends  crucially on various  other group 
characteristics and/or  on specific institutional arrangements  that may 
vary  from  one  country to  the  other,  or even within a  country  from  one 
industry to  the  other.  At  any rate,  the  phenomenon of changing relative 
success  of interest groups  over  the election cycle certainly deserves  some 
further attention and could lead to  deeper  insights  into  the  dynamics  of 
political decisions. 
The  fact  that the U.S.  wheat producer  support is relatively lower  in 
presidential election years  than in other years  appears  to be not 
13 implausible,  however.  First,  wheat producers  represent only  a  very small 
fraction of the electorate and probably play only  a  marginal  role  in the 
political economic  calculus  in presidential election campaigns.  Second, 
wheat  producers  are predominantly located in states that do  not have  a 
large number  of electoral votes,  such as  Kansas  and  some  other Great 
Plains states.  Political favors  tend to be  allocated  (or promised  to be 
allocated)  to larger states where  more  electoral votes  are at stake  such 
as  California,  Florida or New  York. 9 
4.  Summary  and Conclusions 
As  has  been  shown,  the U.S.  producer price support  in wheat  is 
endogenous  rather than exogenous.  The  results of the  empirical analysis 
suggest that the  structure underlying wheat price support was  relatively 
stable during  the period analyzed.  Producer price support  in wheat  could 
be  explained largely by policymakers'  expectations of the U.S.  share  in 
world exports,  by price policy related budgeting expenditures,  and by 
presidential election years.  The  hypothesis  that interest groups' 
relative power  changes  characteristiscally over  the election cycle could 
not be  rejected by  the  empirical analysis.  All other things being equal, 
price support  in wheat  is lower  in presidential election than in non-
election years.  This  suggests  that U.S.  wheat producers have not been 
able  to position themselves  on  the political economic  market  such that 
they contain the decisive voter. 
The  results of this  study have  some  interesting implications  for 
international  interactions of national agricultural policy decisions  in 
various  countries.  At present,  another  round of multilateral 
negotiations  on  the  reduction of international trade barriers under  the 
14 GATT.  One  of the central issues of this  round of negotiations  is 
distortions of agricultural  trade.  While  previous  GATT  rounds  have  been 
rather successful  in reducing barriers  to  trade  in general,  this has  not 
been the  case with regard to agricultural trade policy measures  and other 
instruments  that distort international agricultural trade. 
Two  main actors  in the Uruguay  round of GATT  negotiations  are  the 
United States  and  the  European  Community  (EC).  Both political entities 
support their farmers  via agricultural price policy.  Some  authors have 
argued that the potential benefits of a  unilateral reduction in producer 
price support by  the United States  (and many  other countries)  are  large 
and,  therfore,  the United States would be well  advised to pursue  this 
strategy irrespective of the  outcome  of the  GATT  negotiations  (Paarlberg, 
1987).  This  assessment  is certainly valid.  Others have  argued that only 
a  coordinated strategy of major  trading countries would be politically 
feasible,  as  a  unilateral support price reduction would be  counteracted by 
other trading countries'  policy adjustments  (Karp  and McCalla,  1983; 
Runge,  von Witzke,  and Thompson,  1987).  An  application of the  results  in 
this paper  to wheat price support by  the United States  and  the  European 
Community,  may  help  to  shed  some  more  light on this controversial 
discussion. 
Assume  the United States were  to phase  out producer price support 
unilaterally.  As  the United States  is  a  large  country in terms  of exports 
in wheat  and other  important agricultural commodities,  the resulting 
decline  in production and exports would  increase world market prices, 
ceteris paribus.  This  in turn would  reduce  the  export subsidies per unit 
in the  Community  and  thus budgetary expenditures  there.  As  has  been 
shown,  declining budgetary expenditures result in relatively higher 
15 agricultural support prices  in the  EC  which  in turn would  reduce world 
market prices  (von Witzke,  1986).  Therefore,  in the  absence  of an 
agreement  on agricultural policy adjustment  toward  lower  support prices, 
U.S.  agriculture would have  to carry the  main burden of adjustment.  The 
Common  Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  of the  European  Community  would benefit, 
as  the  reduced U.S.  price support acts  to alleviate budgetary pressure  on 
the  CAP. 
This  in turn would  lead to  a  relatively higher support price level 
there.  As  the  EC  is a  large wheat producer  (and exporter)  as well,  the 
growth  in exports would  reduce  the world market price and result in 
relatively higher adjustment costs  in the U.S.  wheat  industry.  The 
argument with regard to  a  unilateral price reduction is analogous,  mutatis 
mutandis.  As  the  1988  declaration by an international group  of 
agricultural and trade economists  states:  "(I)t is correctly perceived 
that concerted action on  a  comprehensive basis  to reduce  the distortions 
produced by national  farm  support policies  and illiberal food  trade 
arrangements will substantially reduce  the  adjustments  required for  each 
country's agriculture." 
16 Footnotes 
1)  For  a  comprehensive  survey see Rausser,  Lichtenberg and Lattimore 
(1982). 
2)  For  a  discussion of international aspects  of national agricultural 
policy formation see e.g.  Wallerstein  (1980),  Karp  and McCalla  (1983), 
von Witzke  (1986). 
3)  Rent-seeking activities as  in the  approaches  by Krueger  (1974), 
Bhagwati  and Srinivasan  (1980)  and Bhagwati  (1982)  are  implicitly 
captured.  See  below. 
4)  While  it may  be  defensible  to neglect most  of the  other  instruments 
employed  in grains  and  to  focus  on  the producer price only it may  be 
less  so with regard to  the base  acreage  for  deficiency payments. 
However,  producer price support  and base  acreage  are not unrelated 
which  can be  seen to be reflected in eq.  2  (see below). 
5)  As  the knowledge  of the  determinants of agricultural policies is still 
rather limited,  it appears  reasonable  to restrict the analysis  to  a 
less  comprehensive  problem. 
6)  Or  a  linear approximation. 
7)  As  Nelson  (1983)  notes with regard to U.S.  policymakers'  attitudes 
towards  agricultural policy:  "A  Secretary of Agriculture  loses 
decision making authority when he  advocates  farmers'  interest because 
a  strong farmers'  advocate  is not  a  credible decision maker  when major 
trade-offs  among  non-farm as well  as  farm  constituencies are 
concerned." 
8)  t-values  in parentheses.  The  wheat  support price P is in $/bushel; 
the  US  share  in world wheat  exports  is in per cent;  and budgetary 
expenditures  of wheat price policy are  in $1000. 
9)  lowe this  argument  to Daniel  W.  Bromley. 
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Figure  1.  The  Real  U.S.  Wheat  Producer  Support  Price 
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